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Abstract: 
 
The traditional way to measure the active management of a fund is to calculate its tracking 
error: as measured by the standard deviation of the difference in a fund’s returns versus its 
benchmark returns. However, tracking error alone is an inadequate measure of fund activity 
since even very actively managed funds can in fact generate rather low tracking errors. 
Therefore judging the activity level of a fund based solely on tracking error can be 
misleading. In addition, while tracking error volatility is easy to calculate it only infers what 
the manager is doing at the portfolio level and does tell you how the tracking errors were 
generated. For instance, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) argue that the two distinct 
approaches to active management, stock selection or factor risk, can produce significantly 
different tracking errors.  
 
Instead of using tracking error alone Cremers and Petajisto (2009) suggest that a more 
comprehensive picture of active management can be achieved by including Active Share 
into the calculations, where the Active Share of the fund is measured as half the sum of the 
absolute difference between the fund’s holdings and those of the benchmark portfolio. In 
other words, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) claim that using Active Share and tracking error 
together enables investors to distinguish between the types of active management used by 
funds, stock selection and factor risk, and so classify funds by their investment management 
strategy: pure indexes, closet indexes, diversified stock pickers, concentrated stock pickers, 
and factor bets. 
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Real Estate Fund Active Management 
 
Introduction 
 
The traditional way to measure the active management of a fund is to calculate its tracking 
error: as measured by the standard deviation of the difference in a fund’s returns versus its 
benchmark returns (see inter alia, Alford et al, 2003, Higgins and Ng, 2009, and Higgins, 
2010).  However, tracking error alone is an inadequate measure of fund active management 
since even very actively managed funds can in fact have rather low tracking errors. 
Therefore judging the activity level of fund management based solely on tracking error can 
be misleading.  In addition, there exists plenty of “closet indexing” among these so called 
actively managed funds.  Closet indexing is referred to when a fund that claims to be actively 
managed, and therefore charges high management fees, in fact acts like a passive index 
fund by closely replicating some benchmark index.  Finally while tracking error volatility 
makes sense and is easy to calculate, it only infers what the manager is doing at the 
portfolio level and does not tell you how the tracking errors were generated.  For instance, 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) argue that the two distinct approaches to active management, 
stock selection or factor risk, can produce substantially different tracking errors.  
 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) suggest that a fund’s level of active management would be 
better understood by examining the actual holdings in the portfolio and comparing those 
holdings to its benchmark index, which the authors call Active Share.  The authors argue 
that there are two reasons why Active Share is a useful method to measure fund’s active 
management.  First, since an active manager can only add value relative to the benchmark 
by deviating from it, Active Share can help in identifying managers capable of delivering 
positive alpha through their stock picking activity.  Second, Active Share can also be 
combined with the traditional method of measuring the active management of a fund, 
tracking error, to provide a more comprehensive way to measure active management.  In 
other words, by using the double sources of active management, Active Share and tracking 
error, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) are able to classify the funds into one of five investment 
management strategies categories: pure indexers, closet indexers, diversified stock pickers, 
concentrated stock pickers, and factor bet funds.  
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge the dual sources of active management, Active Share 
and tracking error, have not been applied in the real estate market so this paper is the first to 
apply such an approach to classify real estate funds in the UK into the five active 
management categories identified by Cremers and Petajisto (2009).  Then, after the fund 
categorization, we compare their return performance against Active Share, tracking error, 
fund size and leverage.  Therefore the paper will be able to answer two of the fundamental 
questions of investment: (1) does active management add value and (2) what form of active 
management, stock selection or factor risk, is better at adding value to the fund?  As such 
our results will be of interest to investors and financial consultants in revealing which factors 
should be considered in selecting real estate funds. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section discusses the 
difference between active and passive management.  This is followed by a review of the 
approaches used to measure active management.  Section 4 outlines the research design. 
The next section presents the fund data.  Section 6 presents the fund classification results 
for the overall sample period, while the next section tests the robustness of the classification 
results in three sub-periods.  Section 8 then compares the performance of funds against 
their level of active management, while the final section presents the conclusions. 
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Active and Passive Management 
 
Fund managers have two ways to exercise their business.  They can operate an active fund 
management policy, or, on the other hand they may be more passive.  Investors investing in 
actively managed funds seek expertise from the fund managers who are assumed to have a 
more comprehensive view of the current market situation than investors themselves.  This 
will be done by analysing individual investments and the market in general and actively 
trying to differentiate the fund holdings from the benchmark index holdings.  Passive 
management, or “indexing”, in comparison involves assembling a portfolio of assets that 
mirrors the performance of a given asset market or its corresponding index.  Passively 
managed funds are often a cheap way to invest in funds and they also offer the advantage 
of diversification.  In contrast, actively managed funds are expected to add value by 
deviating from their relative benchmark, but as a consequence are less diversified than 
passive funds and are more expensive to manage.  
 
What distinguishes passive from active fund strategies is the composition of total risk 
exposure.  Both active and passive fund strategies will incur ‘incidental’ risk, while the active 
strategy will also incur ‘intentional’ risk.  Incidental risk will occur since neither fund 
management strategy can ever hold assets that exactly match the benchmark portfolio due 
to market frictions such as transaction costs and liquidity constraints etc. (see inter alia, 
Chiang,1998; Keim, 1999; and Frino and Gallagher, 2001).  Intentional risk arises in active 
fund strategies as they try to outperform a given benchmark by taking positions that differ 
from those in the benchmark.  
 
There are two basic ways for a fund manager to engage in intentional or active risk (Fama, 
1972).  The first is through ‘stock selection’, which means owning investments that are in the 
index, but at a weight that is higher or lower than what is in the index.  The second way to 
raise active risk is through ‘factor risk’, by overweighting or underweighting sectors that have 
different market risk factors.  For instance, a manager who is bullish on an economic 
recovery might overweight sectors that are economically sensitive, or a manager who is 
bearish might overweight defensive sectors.  Either approach results in different portfolio 
weightings relative to a manager’s official benchmark index.  
 
A dilemma arises however when a fund claims to be actively managed but the fund manager 
decides to act like a passive fund.  These kinds of funds are often referred as ‘closet index’ 
funds, since while the fund may claim to be actively managed, and therefore charges high 
management fees, in fact acts like an index fund by closely replicating some benchmark 
index.  This is naturally the opposite of what investors are paying active managers for.  
Petajisto (2010) argues that closet index funds generally exist because their managers 
believe it is safer for them, in terms of their own career prospects, if they track an index 
rather than take greater risks with more active management, i.e. no one ever gets sacked for 
matching the performance of his benchmark. 
 
The classification of funds on their level of active management is of interest for at least three 
reasons.  First, it is important to see whether funds indeed are what they say they are: active 
or passive. In particular, it is important to see whether the fund which has classified itself as 
an active fund is in fact a ‘closet index’ fund.  Identifying ‘closet indexers’ is essential 
because active management fees can be a significant hurdle to outperforming the index for 
anyone holding a portfolio similar to its benchmark.  It is equally important to see whether a 
passive fund manager is taking ‘intentional’ risks, rather than mimicking the performance of 
the benchmark, which is what they are expected to do.  
 
Second, it is important to identify the active management strategy the fund is following to 
achieve any outperformance.  Such a classification will be of benefit to investors as it will 
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enable them to allocate their funds to different active managers in line with their expectations 
of future market performance.  For instance, if investors expect the future market to be very 
tranquil, with very few investment opportunities, there is little point to hold active funds with 
their high fees, when a passive fund will offer similar performance at lower cost.  However, if 
the market is expected to be a boom period, with a large number of investment 
opportunities, investing in an actively managed fund maybe the more attractive option.  
 
Lastly, the main reason investors decide to invest in actively managed funds is that they are 
expected to outperform their benchmark index.  Therefore, it is important to see whether 
active management adds value and what form of active management, stock selection or 
factor risk, is better at adding value to the fund. 
 
The Two Dimensions of Active Management 
 
Tracking Error 
 
The traditional measurement of active management is to calculate tracking error1 of the fund; 
as measured by the standard deviation of the difference in a fund’s returns versus its 
benchmark returns.  The formula for (ex-post) tracking error is presented below: 
 ܶ�����݊� ���݋� =  �ሺܴ� − ܴ�ሻ,    (1) 
 
where σ equals standard deviation, Rp equals the portfolio return, and Rb equals the 
benchmark return. 
 
The logic behind the measurement is that the makeup of the individual investments in the 
portfolio will be reflected in the pattern of the returns.  If the returns of the fund deviate from 
the index returns significantly through time, the makeup of the fund must be significantly 
different from the index.  High tracking error indicates that the fund return has varied a lot in 
relation to benchmark return.  Correspondingly, low tracking error indicates that the fund and 
benchmark returns have been close to each other.  In other words, the tracking error figure 
reveals the degree of active risk the fund is taking in searching of added value.  
 
It is assumed that actively managed funds tend to generate higher tracking errors than those 
of passively managed funds.  This is due to the fact that active fund managers try to beat the 
benchmark index by constructing a fund that differs from the benchmark index, whereas 
passively managed funds simply replicate the benchmark index.  However, even though in 
theory the tracking error of the index fund should equal zero, in practice this is rarely the 
case. Chiang (1998) points out fund managers adopting an indexing approach can’t 
guarantee that their funds’ performance will be identical to the benchmark index, due to 
transaction costs, fund cash flows, the volatility of the benchmark, the treatment of income in 
index returns and changes in index composition through time.  A view shared by Frino and 
Gallagher (2001) who argue that given market frictions tracking error is unavoidable, even in 
passively managed funds (see also Keim, 1999).  Despite these issues Frino and Gallagher 
(2001) state that tracking error is a natural way to manage passive funds.  
 
Arguing that “it is now commonplace to categorize active managers by the level of active 
risk” Alford et al (2003) used tracking error to categories US equity funds into three groups: 
“passive”, “structured” and “active”.  Alford et al (2003) define a “passive” fund as one with a 
tracking error of less than 1.0% over a full investment period, which includes booms and 
busts, or 0.5% or lower for during stable times.  A “structured” fund in contrast should display 
a tracking error of between 1% and 5% over a full period, while, an “active” fund should 
                                                          
1
 Israelsen and Cogswell (2007) consider “differential from benchmark” to be more instructive and constructive 
term than “error”.  
Page 4 
 
show a tracking error between 5% and 15% over a full investment period but 3% during 
normal times2.  Using this definition of a fund’s investment style Alford et al (2003) conclude 
that managers who exhibit more investment discipline produce higher returns.  Specifically, 
they show that active managers who do a better job of controlling their tracking errors 
outperform both passive portfolios and other active managers with less risk-evaluating skill.   
 
The approach of Alford et al (2003) has also been used to categorise both wholesale 
securitised property funds and unlisted wholesale property funds in Australia (Higgins and 
Ng, 2009 and Higgins, 2010).  A wholesale securitised property fund invests in Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) with the aim of replicating a particular property index.  In 
comparison, Australian unlisted wholesale property funds are equivalent to UK property 
funds and hold properties directly.  
 
Higgins and Ng (2009) categorised 16 securitised property funds with complete quarterly 
data over the period from 2000 to 2007.  The authors found that, based on the spectrum of 
investment styles, as detailed by Alford et al (2003), 13 could be labelled “structured”, two 
funds “passive” and only one “active”.  Interestingly, the authors report that the rankings 
based on tracking errors appeared unrelated to other key investment performance measures 
such as the Sharpe ratio and the information ratio.  The authors attribute this to the poor 
performance of the active and some structured securitised property funds during the market 
decline. 
 
Higgins (2010) used two sets of unlisted wholesale property funds data, eight that had been 
in existence since 2002 and four property funds which started after 2005.  For all the 
property funds the author finds that they could be grouped into two of the three Alford et al 
(2003) categories: “structured” and “active”.  However, Higgins (2010) notes that the newer 
property funds that commenced after 2005 all had relatively high tracking errors compared 
with the established funds, which the author suggests results from their higher debt ratios.  
The author also notes that apart from one retail property fund, the tracking errors of property 
funds changed considerably between the stable and abnormal property market conditions.  
Finally, Higgins (2010) cautions that the use of tracking error alone in categorising the active 
style of funds is probably too subjective and recommends other characteristics should be 
evaluated such as the number of buildings and debt levels in the fund.  In particular, Higgins 
(2010) finds that property funds with large property portfolios and low debt levels, i.e. below 
20%, provided better tracking error performance. 
 
Active Share 
 
Active Share is found by analysing the actual holdings of a manager’s portfolio and 
comparing those holdings to its benchmark index (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). By 
measuring active management in this way, investors can get a clearer understanding of what 
exactly a manager is doing at the individual asset level to achieve outperformance, rather 
than drawing conclusions from tracking errors.  
 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) define Active Share as: 
 ������ ܵℎ��� =  ଵଶ ∑ |�௙��ௗ,� − ���ௗ௘�,�|ே�=ଵ    (2) 
 
Where: Wfund,i and W index,i are the portfolio weights of stock i in a fund and in its benchmark 
index; the sum is taken over the N holdings in the index and in the fund.  
 
                                                          
2
 Vardharaj et al (2004) suggest the typical levels of tracking error, measured as an annualised standard 
deviation, should be: zero for an index fund; below 2% for an enhanced index fund and between 5 and 10% for 
an actively managed fund. 
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Equation (2) shows that Active Share is calculated as half the sum of the absolute difference 
between the fund’s weight and the index’s weight for all the investments represented in the 
fund and in the index. The sum is divided by 2 to ensure that Active Share takes on a value 
between zero and 100%3. If the fund fully replicates the benchmark index then the Active 
Share should be zero, i.e. the fund is totally passive. Correspondingly, if the fund’s holdings 
differ completely from the benchmark index the Active Share equals 100% signalling that the 
fund is totally active.  For all other values between zero and 100% Active Share determines 
the degree to which a fund is actively managed.  
 
Tracking error and Active Share 
 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) argue that the two distinct approaches to active management, 
stock selection or factor risk, can produce substantially different tracking error volatilities. A 
stock picker funds generates alpha with stock selection within sectors and diversifies across 
sectors. In contrast, ‘factor risk’ fund managers concentrate in a particular sector that is 
expected to outperform its benchmark index while holding mostly diversified positions within 
the sector. The outcome is such that the ‘factor risk’ fund has substantially higher tracking 
error than the stock picker fund, which seems to imply that the in ‘factor risk’ fund is much 
more active. However, the lower tracking error for the stock picker funds comes from the 
diversification benefits from spreading across different sectors and so understates its level of 
active management.  
 
For instance, say a portfolio has 40 investments. If all of the positions are in the office sector 
and so are highly correlated, then small active positions will generate high tracking error, due 
to ‘factor’ risk. On the other hand, say the benchmark index is composed of 20 market 
sectors with 20 properties in each sector. If the fund again holds 40 properties made up of 
two properties from each of the 20 sectors. The fund will display a low tracking error due to 
low correlation across the sectors, but its Active Share will be high. In other words, while 
tracking error does an effective job in capturing ‘factor’ risk it does not capture ‘stock 
selection’ risk, whereas Active Share captures the uniqueness of the portfolio manager’s 
stock-picking activity.  
 
To get a better picture of active management and identify the two forms of active risk within a 
fund, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) argue that Active Share and tracking error should be 
examined together.  In other words, using Active Share and tracking error together enables 
investors to distinguish between the types of active management used by funds, stock 
selection and factor risk, and so enable the funds to be categorised into five management 
approaches: pure indexers; closet indexers; diversified stock pickers; concentrated stock 
pickers; and factor bet funds, as presented in Figure 1.  
 
In Figure 1 Active Share, measured on the vertical axis, is used by Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) to reflect stock selection, while tracking error, on the horizontal axis, is used to 
represent the factor risk dimension of active management. Different parts of the two-
dimensional distribution of funds can be labelled according to the type of active management 
they represent, as illustrated in Figure 1. The boundaries of the regions are not clear-cut with 
only the ‘Pure Index’ group standing out as a distinct group positioned at the origin while the 
other four categories are defined as:  
 
- Closet Indexing tends to display low Active Share and low tracking error.  
This type of portfolio management can result in “active-type” fees, (higher) 
in exchange for little more than passive index performance. 
                                                          
3
 Remember that the sum of the weights for any fund’s investments is 100% and the sum of the weights of the 
index’s constituents is 100%. So, if the fund contained none of the investments in the index, then the sum of the 
absolute differences would be 200%; dividing by 2 reduces the calculation in this extreme example to 100%. 
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- Factor Bets typify managers maintaining portfolios that overweight and 
underweight systematic factors such as sectors, market capitalizations, or 
investment style.  These managers tend to have low Active Share but high 
tracking error. 
 
- Diversified Stock Picks are indicative of high Active Share but low tracking 
error.  These managers tend to take significant stock-specific positions 
across sectors so that stock position sizes vary significantly from those in 
the benchmark but overall sector weightings may be similar to the 
benchmark. 
 
- Concentrated Stock Picks typify managers that take large, stock-specific 
positions in a few sectors so that both stock position sizes and sector 
weightings vary significantly from those in the benchmark.  These 
managers tend to have high Active Share and high tracking error. 
 
Figure 1: The Two Dimensions of Active Management 
 
 
 
While there is a positive correlation between Active Share and tracking error, i.e. when 
Active Share is low tracking error tends to be low and when Active Share is high tracking 
error tends to be high, the results show some amount of variation. For instance, Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009) found that funds with 4-6% tracking errors can have Active Shares 
ranging from 30% to 100%, and funds with 70-80% Active Shares can have tracking errors 
ranging from 2% to over 14%. In other words, “stock picker” funds can be very active despite 
low tracking error volatilities, while “factor risk” funds can generate large tracking errors 
without large deviations from index holdings.  
 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) applied the dual Active Share and tracking error method to 
measure the active management of 2,650 US funds from 1990-2003 and found that, on 
average, fund performance is correlated with the degree of active management as measured 
by Active Share.  They found that funds with the highest Active Share exhibited some skill 
and picked stocks which outperformed their benchmarks by 2.40% per year. After fees and 
transaction costs this out-performance decreased to 1.13% per year.  In contrast, funds with 
the lowest Active Share had poor benchmark-adjusted returns before expenses, 0.11%, and 
they did even worse after expenses, underperforming by -1.42%.  These results indicate that 
the most actively managed funds are able to beat the benchmark indices by using their 
knowledge and expertise.  On the other hand, the funds that replicate the benchmark indices 
generate quite similar returns than the benchmarks before fees, but the after fees returns are 
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lower than the benchmarks.  The authors also find that tracking error by itself is unrelated to 
fund performance, which confirms the findings of Higgins and Ng (2009). 
 
In a follow-up study, Petajisto (2010) analysed 1,124 U.S. all-equity mutual funds monthly 
returns from 1990 to 2009. Importantly, these results include a period when large cap stocks 
did well (the 1990s), small cap stocks outperformed (the 2000s), and the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC).  Petajisto (2010) found that Active Share was correlated with improved 
performance, while higher tracking error on its own was not.  When both measures were 
combined, the research concluded that “diversified stock picker”’ funds with high Active 
Share and low-to-moderate tracking error performed the strongest, producing an average 
annual excess net return over the period of 1.26%, net of all expenses and costs.  In 
contrast, funds with low Active Share (closet indexers) and funds focusing on factor bets 
consistently underperformed their benchmarks primarily due to fees and expenses. 
 
Research Design 
 
Our methodology closely follows that of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2010) 
with a few exceptions. First, unlike Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2010) we 
used only one index as our benchmark portfolio. In contrast, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
and Petajisto (2010) used the benchmark index self-reported by a manager in the fund 
prospectus.  The benefit of the prospectus benchmark is that it is the index the fund 
manager has publicly committed to beat, so both investors and the manager are likely to 
focus on performance relative to that benchmark.  However, from an inspection of 
information that is available on each fund it very soon became apparent that the benchmark 
used has varied over time and with the changes in managers, leaving us with no consistent 
way to identify the funds’ precise benchmark and so we used the UK property index with the 
widest coverage, on a quarterly basis, the Investment Property Databank (IPD) Quarterly 
Index (IPDQI)4.  
 
Second, like Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2010) we use property data alone 
in calculating the Active Share of each fund and exclude fund holdings in listed property and 
cash. Listed property and cash holdings typically represented only 0.06% and 3.63% on 
average, respectively, so there was very little qualitative and quantitative difference between 
the results if we included or excluded these two items. Nonetheless, the results below are 
based on the property data alone, rescaled to 100%, after excluding holdings in listed 
property and cash. 
 
Third, we use an approach which is similar to that of the Industry Concentration Index of 
Kacperczyk et al (2005). We do this because data at the individual property level is not 
available, due to confidentially, but data at the market segment level is, which is akin to an 
industry classification scheme.  
 
However, unlike Kacperczyk et al (2005) we do not sum the squared differences between 
the fund segment holdings and those in the benchmark. As Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
note if we use the absolute difference rather than the squared difference in the Active Share 
calculation it tells us the percentage of a fund that is different from the benchmark index. 
However, if the difference in weights is squared, the numerical value loses this interpretation. 
Therefore we use a hybrid version of equation 2 to calculate the Active Share of real estate 
funds in the UK as in equation 3:  
 
                                                          
4
 At the end of December 2011 the IPDQI contained 9,188 properties from 239 funds with an estimated capital 
value of £107,538m, representing 49.9% of the UK property market. By way of a comparison, the IPD Monthly 
Index only covered data from 70 funds with 3,592 properties and an estimated capital value of £33,128m, 
representing only 14.5% of the market. 
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������ ܵℎ��� =  ଵଶ ∑ |�௙��ௗ,� − ���ௗ௘�,�|ெ��=ଵ    (3) 
 
Where: Wfund,i and Windex,i are the portfolio weights of property market segment i in a fund and 
in its benchmark index and sum up across MS market segments (instead of N individual 
properties).  
 
There are 10 market segments used by IPD in their standard performance analysis reports 
to investors. According to tests performed by IPD the 10 market segments maximises the 
explanatory variance in returns across individual properties and is the most effective split for 
performance analysis (Fordsham and Key, 1996). The 10 market segments are: Standard 
Retail Southeast, Standard Retail Rest of UK, Shopping Centres, Retail Warehouses, 
Offices in the City of London, Offices in the West End, Offices Rest of Southeast, Offices 
Rest of UK, Industrials Southern and Eastern, and Industrials Rest of UK. However, we also 
included another category into the calculation, Other Property, which represents holdings in 
non-traditional property sectors that are held by a number of funds such as: residential 
property, student housing and leisure property, etc. The 11 market segments weights 
calculated from the IPDQI data series.  
 
Fourth, unlike Cremers and Petajisto (2009) but like Petajisto (2010) we compute tracking 
error as the standard deviation of the benchmark-adjusted return, rather than as the residual 
volatility from a regression of the fund return on its benchmark index, as proposed by 
Treynor and Black (1973)5.  
 
Fifth, due to data limitations we use the nine-year average Active Share and tracking error 
figures when categorizing the funds, whereas Cremers and Petajisto (2009) rebalanced the 
categories every year. However, to test whether the fund categorisation changed over the 
period we divided the sample period into three sub-periods based on the performance of the 
market index: (1) Q4:2003 to Q1:2007 the period before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); 
(2) the period during the GFC, Q2:2007 to Q4:2009; and (3) the period after the GFC 
Q1:2010 to Q4:2011.  
 
Finally, after the fund allocation we compared the return performance of funds against Active 
Share, tracking error, size and leverage to see if active management adds value.  
 
Fund Data 
 
Data on 38 UK real estate funds are used in this study, which had complete return and 
market segment data over the period from Q4:2003: to Q4:2011.  All the data is taken from 
the publications of the Association of Real Estate Funds (AREF) as compiled by IPD.  
 
Of the 61 real estate funds covered by AREF at the end of 2011, 23 funds were excluded as 
they had had incomplete balance sheet data or insufficient returns data over the period.  The 
remaining 38 real estate funds accounting for 67% of the £19,793 billion aggregate value of 
funds covered by AREF at the end of 2011.  In addition, as the NAV of the funds varies 
widely from £55 million to £2,112 billion, the results should be indicative of real estate fund 
performance over this period.  Nonetheless, the results only hold for those real estate funds 
that existed throughout the sample period. 
 
IPD classify real estate funds into two categories: Specialist and Balanced.  IPD define a 
Specialist real estate fund as such when 70% or more of their capital is invested in one 
                                                          
5
 In the original working paper by Cremers and Petajisto (2006) tracking error was computed this way. However, 
in the published version (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009) the authors used the regression residual approach. In the 
follow-up study Petajisto (2010) reverted to the traditional approach and calculated tracking error as the standard 
deviation of the benchmark-adjusted return. 
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specific market sector (e.g. Retail, Office, Industrial or Residential).  In all other cases the 
fund is categorised as a Balanced fund.  We have 20 Balanced funds and 18 Specialist 
funds in our sample, under the IPD classification scheme. 
 
A casual examination of the objectives of the funds indicated that their typical investment 
objective was to achieve above-average performance through active management of some 
kind.  In other words, all real estate funds, either Specialist or Balanced, claim to be pursuing 
an active fund management strategy.  However, simply looking at the fund’s objectives is 
generally unhelpful in identifying the kind of active management strategy they are following6.  
Nonetheless, from the IPD definition of Balanced/Specialist we can assume that the two fund 
types are following different active management strategies.  
 
A Balanced fund diversifies the portfolio across the various property sectors and so should 
have a low tracking error.  However, the property segment holdings of a Balanced fund could 
be very different from those of the benchmark, which implies they are likely to have a 
relatively high Active Share.  This implies that Balanced funds are expected to be classified 
as ‘index’ funds of some kind either “closet index” funds or even “pure index” funds, 
depending on their level of Active Share.  
 
A Specialist fund manager, by definition, concentrates his holdings in a particular market 
sector and then diversifies within the sector and so is likely to display a high tracking error 
due to factor risk, i.e. holding market sector weights radically different to the benchmark 
index.  Nonetheless, it is still possible that the Specialist fund may have a high or low Active 
Share depending on which property sector it is holding and to what extent it is diversified 
within that sector.  In other words, Specialist funds are expected to be classified as 
“diversified stock pickers” or “concentrated stock pickers” or even “factor bet” funds. 
 
It will be instructive therefore to see whether the dual sources of active management, Active 
Share and tracking error, are able to identify the active management approaches of each 
fund and to what extent the IPD classification scheme (Balanced and Specialist) provides 
investors with a classification of funds that indicates the extent of active management used 
by the funds. 
 
Fund Classification  
 
In this section the level of active management in UK real estate funds is measured by using 
Active Share and tracking error and the funds are then assigned to the various forms of 
active management as identified by Cremers and Petajisto (2009).  The results presented 
graphically in Figure 2 with Active Share measured on the vertical axis, while tracking error 
is on the horizontal axis.  
 
In order to assign funds into the various active management approaches Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) suggest an Active Share of at least 80% is needed to divide stock pickers 
from index funds.  The authors suggesting that an annualised tracking error of 8% is needed 
to divide stock pickers into “diversified stock pickers” and “concentrated stock pickers”. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) label a fund a “closet indexer” only if it’s Active Share is less 
than 60% and its annualised tracking error is less than 6%.  The authors arguing that a fund 
needs an annualised tracking error greater than 6% while its Active Share needs to be below 
80% in order for it to be categorised as a “factor bets” fund.  Finally, for a fund to be 
classified as a “pure index” fund, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) argue that it should have an 
Active Share of less than 20%.  
 
                                                          
6
 See for example, AREF/IPD Property Fund Vision Handbook Q3 2012.  
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The average annualised tracking error of the sample is 7%7, with only one fund (3%) with a 
tracking error below 3% and four funds (11%) with tracking errors above 20%.  This 
suggests that the majority of funds in the sample can have substantially different quarterly 
returns than the benchmark index.  In comparison, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find that 
the majority of their equity funds had lower tracking errors.  For example, at the end of 2002, 
of the mutual funds in their sample Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find that 59% had tracking 
errors below 8% and 88% of their sample had tracking errors below 12%, while only 5% had 
tracking errors above 16%.  
 
The difference in tracking errors between real estate funds and equity funds is not surprising. 
Equity mutual funds can easily hold enough stocks to track a market benchmark due to the 
divisibility and small lot sizes in stock markets.  In contrast, due to the indivisibility and large 
lots sizes in the commercial real estate market it is impossible for a fund to hold the market 
benchmark.  Indeed, studies suggest show that for investors to achieve a satisfactory level 
of diversification would need to hold hundreds if not thousands of properties (see inter alia, 
Byrne and Lee, 2000a, 2000b, and 2001; Investment Property Forum, 2007; and Cheng and 
Roulac, 2007).  
 
The average Active Share for the funds in the sample is 54%, with four funds (11%) with 
Active Shares below 25% and sixteen funds (42%) with Active Shares above 75%.  In the 
equity market Cremers and Petajisto (2009) report that 62% of their mutual fund sample had 
Active Shares above 70% and 48% had Active Shares above 80%, while only 14% had 
Active Shares below 50%. 
 
Figure 2: Classification of Funds based on Active Share and Annualised Tracking Error: 
Overall Period 
 
 
 
The results in Figure 2 seem to indicate that the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) view that an 
annualised tracking error boundary of 8% is needed to differentiate between “diversified 
stock pickers” and “concentrated stock pickers” is too small for real estate funds, due to the 
high tracking errors displayed by real estate funds.  In a similar vein, the view that an Active 
Share boundary “of at least 80% or higher” is needed to divide stock pickers from index 
funds suggested by Cremers and Petajisto (2009) appears too high for real estate funds.  
 
We therefore use an Active Share of 50% to divide between stock pickers and index funds. 
To differentiate stock pickers into “diversified stock pickers” and “concentrated stock pickers” 
                                                          
7
 To calculate the annualised tracking error of a fund, we multiple it’s quarterly tracking error by the square root of 
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an annualised tracking error of 12% seems more realistic.  To be a “factor bet” fund we 
suggest a tracking error of at least 12% and an Active Share of less than 50% is more 
sensible.  For a fund to be classified as a “closet index” fund meanwhile we suggest an 
Active Share of less than 50% and a tracking error of less than 6% is more appropriate. 
Finally, we classify a fund as a “pure index” fund if its Active Share is less than 20% and its 
tracking error is less than 4%.  
 
The vast majority of Balanced funds (95%) had tracking errors below 6%. In contrast, 72% of 
the Specialist funds have tracking errors above 6%. Second, all of the Balanced funds have 
Active Shares below 50%, with four (20%) of the Balanced funds with Active Shares below 
25% and two funds (10%) with Actives Shares below 20%.  
 
The figures suggest that the majority of Balanced funds are “closet index” funds. While two 
funds Hermes Property Unit Trust (HPUT) with an Active Share of 17.76% and tracking error 
of 3.26% and UBS Triton Property Fund (UBSPF) with a tracking error of 3.85% and an 
Active Share of 18.96% could potentially be “pure index” funds.  
 
All but one Specialist fund had an Active Share above 70%. In other words, the vast majority 
of Specialist funds are ‘stock picker’ funds of some kind; either “diversified stock pickers” or 
“concentrated stock pickers” depending on their tracking errors.  
 
Figure 2 shows there are four Specialist funds (22%) with tracking error above 20%: 
Grosvenor Festival Place Fund, Grosvenor Shopping Centre Fund, The Junction LP Fund, 
and The Mall Fund. Each of these funds holds just one market segment and generally only a 
few properties within the segment.  For instance, the Grosvenor Festival Place Fund only 
owned one shopping centre, while the Junction fund had only six retail warehouses 
properties, which explains their very high tracking error and high Active Shares. These funds 
can reasonably be classified as “concentrated stock pickers”, while the other 14 Specialist 
funds (78%) are more likely to be “diversified stock picker” funds.  
 
Figure 2 also shows there is a clear split between Balanced and Specialist funds in terms of 
active management, which suggests that the (Balanced/Specialist) classification scheme by 
IPD provides a reasonable classification of funds.  However, the analysis highlight that a 
couple of funds do not fit with the usual definition of Balanced/Specialist as defined by IPD.  
 
A Balanced fund that clearly stands out is the CBRE Property Income Fund (CBREPI), which 
has a tracking error of 10.8% and an Active Share of 48%, which puts it quite close to the 
“factor bet” border.  The main feature of this fund is that about 60% of the fund is in one 
sector (Industrials) and so although it would not be classified as a Specialist fund under the 
IPD definition an analysis of its’ tracking error and Active Share suggests that it is more like 
a Specialist fund.  
 
There is also a Specialist fund (RREEF UK Retail Property Fund (RREEFR)) with a tracking 
error of only 3.36% and an Active Share of 52%, which puts it very close to the “index fund” 
border. As its’ name suggests the fund has 100% of its property holdings in the retail sector 
and so explains it’s relatively high Active Share.  However, the fund is diversified across 
three retail types (Standard retail, Shopping centres and Retail warehouses), which explains 
its low tracking error.  This implies this fund may be better labelled as a Balanced fund. 
 
In summary, the majority of real estate funds have low tracking errors but high Active 
Shares.  This supports the contention of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) that even very 
actively managed funds can in fact have low tracking errors.  The figures also imply that the 
majority of UK real estate funds are taking stock selection risks in order to outperform their 
benchmark indexes.  In addition, the approach of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) is able to 
classify funds on their level of active management (Active Share and tracking error) into 
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categories that make intuitive sense. Balanced funds tend to be ‘index’ funds, while 
Specialist funds tend to be ‘stock picker’ funds.  Lastly, the approach of Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) tends to validate the Balanced/Specialist classification scheme used by IPD, 
with only a few exceptions.  
 
Sub-period Analysis 
 
Due to data limitations we have used nine-year average figures when categorising the funds, 
whereas Cremers and Petajisto (2009) rebalanced the categories after every year.  
Therefore it is important to see whether the fund categorisation results would have changed 
if different time periods were used.  In this section, therefore, we breakdown the sample 
period into three sub-periods based on the performance of the market index: (1) Q4:2003 to 
Q1:2007 the period before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC); (2) the period during the GFC, 
Q2:2007 to Q4:2009; and (3) the period after the GFC Q1:2010 to Q4:2011.  The sub-period 
fund categorisation results are presented in Figures 3 to 5. 
 
In the pre-GFC period Figure 3 shows that the average annualised tracking error was only 
2.56%, with 95% of the funds showing figures below 6% and only two funds with tracking 
errors above 6%.  The average Active Share was 54%, with 92% of the funds with figurers 
above 25%.  
 
Figure 3: Classification of Funds based on Active Share and Annualised Tracking Error:  
Pre-GFC Period 
 
 
 
In line with the results in Figure 2 the Balanced funds showed substantially lower tracking 
errors and Active Shares than Specialist funds. All but one Balanced fund had a tracking 
errors below 3%.  In comparison, only eight Specialist funds (44%) had tracking errors below 
3%, while two funds (11%) had tracking errors above 6%.  All Balanced funds had Active 
Shares below 50% with two Balanced funds with Active Shares below 20%. In contrast, all 
but one Specialist funds had Active Shares above 50%.  
 
CBREPI again stands out from the rest of the Balanced funds with a tracking error of 3.80% 
and an Active Share of 41% in this period, which once again identifies it more like a 
Specialist fund.  In a similar vein, RREEFR had a tracking error of only 2.02% and an Active 
Share of 48% and so keeps it nearer to the Balanced fund group.  The two potential “pure 
index” funds (HPUT and UBSPF) show very low tracking errors of 1.20% and 1.26% 
respectively and Active Shares of 20.44% and 15.69% respectively.  However, the four 
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Specialist funds identified as “concentrated stock pickers” in Figure 2 are less clearly 
delineated from the rest of Specialist funds. 
 
In the second sub-period, covering the period of the GFC, Figure 4 shows that the results 
are much more like those for the whole period with an average tracking error of 5.92% and 
an average Active Share of 54%. Balanced funds had an average Active Share of 29.6%, 
with five funds (25%) with Active Shares below 25%.  Balanced funds had an average 
tracking error of 3.6%, with 19 funds (95%) showing tracking errors below 6%.  Specialist 
funds in comparison had an average Active Shares of 80.9% with all but three funds (83%) 
with Active Shares above 75%.  The Specialist funds had an average tracking error of 8.4% 
with three funds (17%) with tracking errors above 20%. 
 
Figure 4: Classification of Funds based on Active Share and Annualised Tracking Error: 
GFC Period 
 
 
 
Once again CBREPI had a high tracking error of 8.98% and a high Active Share of 46%, 
indicating its potential classification as a Specialist fund.  While, the RREEFR with a tracking 
error of 2.86% and an Active Share of 54% is again producing an activity level more like a 
Balanced fund.  The two potential “pure index” funds (HPUT and UBSPF), once again 
showing very low tracking errors of 2.95% and 3.52% respectively and Active Shares of 
16.83% and 18.66% respectively.  Lastly, the four Specialist funds identified as 
“concentrated stock pickers” in Figure 2 again show the highest tracking errors and relatively 
high Active Shares.  
 
The post-GFC period results in Figure 5 shows that the fund classification is more like the 
pre-GFC period with an average tracking error of 1.85%, with only three funds (17%) with 
tracking errors above 6%.  The average Active Share was 54%, with 84% of the funds with 
Active Shares above 25%.  
 
The split between the two fund types (Balanced and Specialist) is again easy to see.  All but 
one of the Balanced funds had a tracking error below 3%, while 14 Specialist funds (78%) 
had tracking errors below 3% and three Specialist funds (17%) had tracking errors above 
6%.  The Balanced funds all showing Active Shares below 50%, with six of the funds (30%) 
displaying Active Shares below 25%, while, all the Specialist funds had Active Shares above 
50%, with sixteen Specialist funds (89%) having Active Shares above 75%.  
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Figure 5: Classification of Funds based on Active Share and Annualised Tracking Error:  
Post-GFC Period 
 
 
 
The CBRE Property Income Fund (CBREPI) once again shows an active risk level more like 
that of a Specialist fund, with a tracking error of 2.22% and an Active Share of 46%.  The 
RREEF UK Retail Property Fund (RREEFR) with a tracking error of only 0.32% and an 
Active Share of 56% once more is showing an activity level more like a Balanced fund.  
However, of the two potential “pure index” funds only the Hermes Property Unit Trust 
(HPUT) shows an Active Shares below 20%, this clearly classifies it as a “pure index” fund.  
While, the four Specialist funds identified as “concentrated stock pickers” in Figure 2 again 
show the highest tracking errors and high Active Shares.  
 
Table 1: Rank Correlation between Tracking Error and Active Share across Sub-periods 
 
 
Tracking Error Active Share 
 
Pre GFC GFC Post GFC Pre GFC GFC Post GFC 
Pre GFC TE 1.00 
     GFCTE 0.64 1.00 
    Post GFC TE 0.67 0.65 1.00 
   Pre GFC AS 0.75 0.53 0.74 1.00 
  GFC AS 0.73 0.51 0.75 0.96 1.00 
 Post GFC AS 0.74 0.46 0.71 0.92 0.92 1.00 
 
These results imply that the funds in our sample essentially remained in the same categories 
within the sample period, even during markedly different market return periods.  A view 
confirmed by the results in Table 1 which presents the Spearman rank correlation between 
the tracking errors and Active Shares in the three sub-periods.  The correlations in Table 1 
show that the relationships between the measures of active management are strongly 
positive across the three sub-periods, especially for the Active Share calculations.  This 
supports the findings of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) who find that Active Share is a more 
persistent indicator of active management than tracking error.  This makes sense, because 
Active Share is essentially within the control of the fund manager.  However, as shown in 
equation 1, tracking error is influenced as much by the volatility of the market as it is by any 
anything the fund managers can do (see Higgins and Ng, 2009 and Higgins, 2010).  
Therefore we feel justified in saying that the classification of the funds based on the dual 
sources of active management (Active Share and tracking error) is insensitive to the time 
period. 
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Active Management and Returns 
 
We report in Table 2 the average return, Active Share and tracking error across our sample 
period for the various fund groups identified above and for good and bad funds.  We define 
good (bad) performance as being in the top (bottom) five funds in the sample.  Following the 
suggestion of Higgins (2010), that other characteristics should also be evaluated, we also 
report fund size (£m) and leverage (Debt to GAV %) at the start of each sample period to 
avoid biasing the results8. 
 
Table 2: Return, Active Share, Tracking error, Size and Leverage: Overall period 
 
ALL Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Overall Average 1.16  54.0  7.0  388 16.2 
Type Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Pure index 1.65  17.8  3.3  420 4.9 
Closet index 1.33  30.6  4.3  430 7.6 
Div. Stock Pickers 1.35  80.1  6.7  308 24.1 
Con. Stock Pickers -0.48  82.6  21.7  554 37.9 
Top/Bottom Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Top 5 2.28  87.2  7.6  197 22.8 
Bottom 5 -0.61  75.6  12.4  385 44.2 
 
Over the full sample period Table 2 shows that the funds achieved an average return of 
1.16% per quarter with an Active Share of 54% and an annualised tracking error of 7%.  If 
we break the funds down into their active management strategies we can see a number of 
interesting results.  The “pure” index fund (HPUT) produced a return much better than the 
overall average 1.65% compared with 1.16%.  The “closet” index funds were only slightly 
worse (1.33%) than the “diversified stock pickers” (1.35%) with the “concentrated stock 
pickers” the worst group overall (-0.48%).   
 
In terms of size there is little variation from the average size (£388m) apart from the 
“concentrated stock pickers” with an average size of £554m, due to their holdings in 
shopping centres.  However, there is a clear pattern in the amount of leverage used by the 
various groups.  Index funds showing the least use of debt while the more the active the fund 
the greater the use of debt. 
 
These average results however hide a good deal of variation.  The funds in the top five 
places were all “diversified stock pickers” with an Active Share of 87.2% on average but with 
a similar tracking error to the overall average (7.6%).  These funds also were much smaller 
than the average (£197m) and used only a small amount of debt (22.8%).  By way of a 
contrast the bottom five funds consisted of three “diversified stock pickers” and two 
“concentrated stock pickers” with only slightly higher Active Shares than the overall average 
(75.6%) but a much greater tracking error (12.4%).  However, these funds were almost twice 
as big as the ‘best’ funds and used twice as much debt (44%).  This implies that stock 
picking by managers can add value to the fund however if the manager takes on too much 
active risk that results in a large increase in tracking error the benefits of stock picking can 
easily be eliminated.   
 
Table 3 shows that there are noticeable differences in performance of the various fund 
groups over the three sub-periods identified above.  In the first sub-period “diversified stock 
pickers” were the best performing group, closely followed by the “concentrated stock pickers” 
who both benefited from the use of greater leverage.  In contrast, both “index” fund groups 
showed similar but lower returns without the benefit of leverage.  In the period of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) however the “stock picker” funds performed the worst, especially the 
                                                          
8
 Due to data limitations the results for the size and leverage data is based on 35 and 37 funds, respectively. 
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“concentrated stock pickers” due to their greater use of debt, while index funds showed 
much better performance with substantially lower debt.  Lastly in the period after the global 
financial crisis the more active funds have once again shown the best returns, again 
benefiting from their greater use of debt.  
 
Table 3: Return, Active Share, Tracking error, Size and Leverage: Sub-periods 
 
Pre-GFC Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Pure index 4.43 20.4 2.4 420  6.3  
Closet index 4.21 30.9 3.1 430  6.7  
Div. Stock Pickers 5.21 79.9 7.2 308  22.3  
Con. Stock Pickers 4.90 81.4 8.0 554  30.5  
GFC Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Pure index -2.64 16.8 5.9 855  5.6  
Closet index -3.02 30.2 7.4 987  9.1  
Div. Stock Pickers -4.40 80.1 10.3 644  25.3  
Con. Stock Pickers -9.88 83.8 40.2 1228  41.7  
Post-GFC Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Pure index 2.70 14.1 1.0 598  2.6  
Closet index 2.28 30.4 2.0 629  7.5  
Div. Stock Pickers 2.52 80.5 3.8 320  25.3  
Con. Stock Pickers 3.06 83.2 12.2 262  43.7  
 
These observations are supported by the correlation between fund returns, Active Share, 
tracking error, size and leverage in Table 4.  Table 4 shows that over the full sample period 
greater active management together with large size and greater leverage led to lower 
performance.  However, the effect of active management on returns changes radically in the 
various sub-periods.  For instance, in the two boom periods, before and after the global 
financial crisis (GFC), both forms of active management along with greater leverage 
contributed positively to performance.  However, in the period of the global financial crisis 
greater active management and leverage was detrimental to performance.   
 
Table 4: Correlation: Return, Active Share, Tracking error, Size and Leverage 
 
Overall Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Av Ret 1.00  
  
  Av AS -0.15  1.00  
 
  Av TE -0.54  0.57  1.00  
  Av Size -0.17  -0.18  -0.04  1.00  
 Av Lev -0.40  0.55  0.58  -0.01  1.00  
Pre GFC Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Av Ret 1.00  
  
  Av AS 0.53  1.00  
 
  Av TE 0.74  0.70  1.00  
  Av Size -0.05  -0.17  -0.22  1.00  
 Av Lev 0.83  0.54  0.65  -0.02  1.00  
GFC Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Av Ret 1.00  
  
  Av AS -0.44  1.00  
 
  Av TE -0.72  0.51  1.00  
  Av Size -0.15  -0.26  0.03  1.00  
 Av Lev -0.77  0.54  0.52  0.00  1.00  
Post GFC Av Ret Av AS Av TE Av Size Av Lev 
Av Ret 1.00  
    Av AS 0.20  1.00  
   Av TE 0.24  0.60  1.00  
  Av Size 0.03  -0.44  -0.32  1.00  
 Av Lev 0.12  0.53  0.66  -0.26  1.00  
 
Table 4 also shows a number of interesting features about active management, size and 
leverage.  First, although Active Share and tracking error are positively related (0.57) the 
Page 17 
 
relationship is not perfect, i.e. fund managers do not necessarily have both a high Active 
Share and a high tracking error, which corroborates the findings of Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009).  Second, both forms of active management tend to be negatively related to size, 
especially in the most recent period.  This implies that funds become more conservative as 
they grow larger.  Lastly, leverage is significantly positively related to Active Share and 
tracking error, but unrelated to fund size.   
 
From this we can draw a number of conclusions about fund returns and their level of active 
management.  First, funds with high Active Shares can display the highest returns, due to 
their stock-picking ability, which supports the findings of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and 
Petajisto (2010).  However, if the fund fails to control its tracking error the benefits of 
manager’s ability to pick good properties can be eliminated, especially if the fund uses too 
much debt. 
 
Second, “concentrated stock picker” funds exhibited the worst returns over this period mainly 
as a result of their extremely poor performance in the period of the global financial crisis.  
However, in both boom periods such funds displayed some of the highest returns.  Thus, 
terminating a holding in an active fund that underperformed during a bear market may be ill-
advised.  In addition, “concentrated stock picker” funds also offer the investor the opportunity 
to access property assets that are too large for small pension funds to buy such as shopping 
centres, as the in case of the Grosvenor Shopping Centre Fund, or property-types that are 
not on their radar such as the community shopping malls, held by The Mall Fund, which they 
can add to their traditional property portfolio.   
 
Third, while leverage proved beneficial during stable market conditions it was detrimental in 
during the market downturn, as is to be expected, since it is well known that leverage 
increases return volatility (Van der Spek and Hoorenman, 2011), especially in periods of 
market downturns (Plazzi, et al., 2008; Higgins, 2010; and Baum et al, 2012).   
 
Fourth, the performance of the different active management strategies identified through the 
two sources of active risk varies with diverse market conditions, which supports the findings 
of Higgins (2010) and Baum et al (2012). 
 
Lastly, the diversification benefit of “index” funds means they produce relatively low but 
consistent returns in both bull and bear markets.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Tracking error has traditionally been the most common way to measure the active 
management of a fund. It measures how closely the fund return follows the benchmark index 
return.  Deviations in these returns indicate how actively the fund is managed.  However, 
tracking error alone is an inadequate measure of fund activity since even very actively 
managed funds can in fact generate rather low tracking errors. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) 
suggest therefore instead of using tracking error alone a complete picture of active 
management is better achieved by including Active Share into the calculations.  In particular, 
Petajisto (2010) argues that “Active Share is a reasonable proxy for stock selection, whereas 
tracking error is a proxy for systematic factor risk”.  Thus, using the dual measures of active 
management should allow us to identify more easily the type of active management strategy 
the fund is pursuing to add value.  
 
Using data on 38 real estate funds over the period Q4:2003 to Q4:2011 we make a number 
of conclusions.  First, the approach of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2010) is 
able to classify real estate funds in the UK on their management activity into categories that 
makes intuitive sense and seem stable over time.  
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Second, Balanced funds show relatively low Active Shares and particularly low tracking 
errors, due to the benefits of property-type diversification.  In contrast, Specialists funds 
display higher Active Shares and both low and high tracking errors depending on their stock 
picking approach; diversified or concentrated.  In other words, the (Balanced/Specialist) 
classification scheme by IPD provides a reasonable classification of funds.  Nonetheless, 
there are a few exceptions, which can be easily identified by their Active Shares and tracking 
errors.  As such this new approach to fund classification should enable investors to make a 
more informed investment decisions in the future. 
 
Third, an analysis of the performance of the various fund groups displayed a number of 
features of interest.  First, active funds that use a lot of leverage and demonstrate stock-
picking ability can add value, especially in boom periods.  Second, “index” funds, which use 
little or no leverage, show consistent but low returns all the time.  In other words, the 
performance of the different management strategies varies with diverse market conditions.  
This implies that investors need to constantly monitor changes in the market and switch 
between fund management styles, if at all possible. 
 
Finally, like all research the analysis is subject to a couple of caveats.  First, the analysis 
was only based on 38 funds with complete data over the sample period.  Second, the 
relationship between fees and active management was not examined, due to lack of 
consistent data, even though ultimately investors are concerned with returns after 
management fee9.  It would be instructive therefore if the number of funds and time period 
was expanded to see if the results are robust and to see whether management fees rise with 
the increase in Active Share, as would be expected, and whether such an increase 
outweighs the benefits of active manager.   
 
 
  
                                                          
9
 Calculating actual fees paid within funds is complicated as different charges can be applied to different 
investors.  Fees can also be payable on undrawn capital and other fee arrangements and so are difficult to 
estimate.  Nonetheless, results suggest that fees reduced average fund performance by -0.99% per annum over 
the ten years from 2001 to 2010 (Investment Property Forum, 2012). 
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